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From the 1980s through to the early 2000s, UK productivity grew 
reasonably well. The measure of economic output per hour of work 
rose by about 2% a year, on average, before the 2008 financial 
crisis.  Since then, productivity growth has been dismal; for example 
in 2018, Office for National Statistics (ONS) figures showed labour 
productivity growing by only 0.5%. 
The UK’s poor record in productivity growth since the financial crisis 
stands in contrast to its recovery from previous downturns, when 
productivity initially fell, but subsequently recovered to the previous 
growth trend.  The Office of Budget Responsibility thought the same 
would happen this time and has repeatedly forecast returns to more 
robust levels of productivity growth. This hasn’t materialised, however. 
Productivity is seen as an important driver of improved living 
standards over the long term, enabling companies to pay higher 
wages as they are can produce higher revenues with the same or 
fewer resources. 
As Paul Krugman once famously puts it in his 1994 book The Age of 
Diminished Expectations, “Productivity isn’t everything, but, in the long 
run, it is almost everything.  A country’s ability to improve its standard 
of living over time depends almost entirely on its ability to raise its 
output per worker” (page 11).  The UK government has made 
increasing the productivity of British workers a priority of its industrial 
strategy. 
But the UK’s poor productivity performance doesn’t appear to be 
improving. Recent labour market data and GDP 2019 first quarter 
estimates indicate that output per hour – the main ONS measure of 
labour productivity – decreased for the third consecutive quarter by 
0.2% in Quarter 1 of 2019, compared with the same quarter in the 
previous year. Business investment declined throughout 2018 as 
noted in an earlier CBS blog, with fears that it is being damaged by 
Brexit uncertainty, hence affecting productivity growth. 
Britain’s ‘productivity puzzle’ in fact actually contains number of 
elements.[1] One is a ‘productivity level puzzle’ focused on why UK 
productivity did not move back to its pre-financial crisis level after a 
short interval, while the ‘productivity growth puzzle’ focuses on 
why  the  productivity  growth  trend  appears  to  have  fallen  so 
much since the financial crisis. 
A third element has been highlighted of late in terms of the UK’s 
‘regional productivity puzzle’ or why UK interregional productivity 
differences are so great over such short  distances  when the UK’s 
relatively institutional  set-up  ought  to  allow  for  technology diffusion 
across regions.[2] 
The UK does have high-performing and high productivity firms in 
sectors such as pharmaceuticals, automotive sector and the creative 
industries.  It also has some high-performing cities and regions, 
notably London. 
But the overall picture is one of weakness. Investment – both public 
and private – is low. The UK’s dysfunctional housing market inhibits 
labour mobility. There are ongoing weakness in education, training 
and skills provision for much of the population which will be 
exacerbated as the economy enters the Fourth Industrial Revolution. 
There is an over-reliance on the financial sector and there has been 
weak management with a long tail of lowly performing firms[3], along 
with lower levels of advanced capital, R&D and skills-training.[4] 
These factors are long standing in nature, of course, and cannot 
explain the post 2008 productivity slowdown.  It might be that 
aggressive fiscal consolidation, involving sharp cuts in public 
investment, from 2010, may have led to a permanent fall in the 
sustainable level of output in the UK economy.[5] 
Similarly, Wren-Lewis (2017) suggests that the macroeconomic story 
is consistent with the notion that both the 2010 budget followed by 
uncertainty around the EU Referendum from 2015 onwards reduced 
the appetite for investors to engage in capital deepening (where the 
capital per worker increases) for almost a decade,[6] with a knock-on 
effect on productivity. 
Economists’ estimates on the long-term direct impact of Brexit on UK 
productivity – via effects on trade and FDI as trade costs rise and EU 
market access falls – range from an adverse effect on the level of 
GDP per worker of 4 to 8%, depending on various modelling 
assumptions and of course the form of Brexit.[7]  Overall, what this 
suggests is that Brexit will make relative UK productivity performance 
worse not better. 
Recently, Crafts (2019) has asked whether Brexit might allow the UK 
more freedom to reform supply-side policy free of constraints imposed 
by EU membership and by being part of the Single Market.[8] 
His response was negative. Like others, he highlights UK policy 
weaknesses in a range of areas including education and skills, 
infrastructure, innovation, regulation and taxation. But as noted by 
others, these are largely ‘home grown’ issues, already under UK 
policy control. 
Brexit itself will not do anything directly to improve the education 
system, training, or infrastructure, for example. In a broader context, 
might Brexit provide the opportunity for a policy ‘reset’ moment’ that 
could enable policy makers to begin to address the underlying issues 
of Britain’s various productivity puzzles? 
That’s not at all clear when policy makers may anyway be trying to 
minimise the downside effects of Brexit on UK competitiveness. And 
as Jonathan Portes notes in the Brexit Scorecard, so far, this ‘reset 
opportunity’ has been missed; “whether that can change will 
determine the long run success of Brexit.” 
Prospects 
Competitiveness can of course be defined in a number of ways. In 
understanding how Brexit might impact on productivity in the UK, the 
definition used by The World Economic Forum (WEF) is useful here. It 
defines competitiveness as “the set of institutions, policies and factors 
that determine the level of productivity of a country”. 
Given both the complexity of the UK’s economic relationship with the 
European Union built up over decades, and the fact that the form of 
the future trading relationship is not clear, it is of course difficult to 
forecast how Brexit will affect competitiveness (and hence 
productivity) in the future. 
Of the 112 individual indicators that make up its Global 
Competitiveness Index, the WEF suggest that 14 could be directly 
negatively impacted by Brexit, while three (and potentially six) of the 
112 indicators have the potential to positively impacted.[9] 
In this regard, this measure of the UK’s competitiveness will depend 
on how successful the UK is in minimising the potential downside on 
the 14 indicators while maximizing any upside from those that might 
have a positive impact. 
The WEF notes that there aren’t really any precedents but looking at 
other non-EU nations that have a close trading relationship with the 
EU suggests that on many of the indicators that are directly influenced 
by Brexit, the UK currently fares better than non-EU peers such as 
Switzerland and Norway, such as on: the prevalence of non-tariff 
barriers; trade tariffs; the prevalence of foreign ownership; and the 
business impact of rules on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
At the same time, aspects of competitiveness where peers like 
Switzerland and Norway do really well are not directly influenced by 
EU membership, such as Norway’s good score on the 
macroeconomic environment (thanks largely to its oil wealth) or 
Switzerland’s world leading status on innovation (based on a long-
standing collaboration between business and academia). 
It isn’t likely that the UK would be able to match the latter, for 
example, without a much greater effort in various policy areas going 
forward (again requiring a ‘reset’ moment). What this suggests is a 
clear downside risk for UK competitiveness from Brexit with only 
limited upside potential, at least in the short term.[10] 
So the big question remains as to whether Brexit could offer the 
opportunity for a ‘reset’ that could enable policymakers to really start 
to tackle the root causes of the UK’s productivity puzzles. So far, 
though, Brexit has had the opposite effect, effectively paralysing 
policy action in a range of areas. As the Brexit Scorecard concluded, 
perhaps post Brexit this could change, and policymakers could focus 
on such issues, “but at present it is hard to be optimistic”. 
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